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RICO-THE REJECTION OF AN
ECONOMIC MOTIVE REQUIREMENT
NOW v. Scheidler, 114 S. Ct. 798 (1994)
I. INTRODUCrION
In NOW v. Scheidler,1 the United States Supreme Court held that
the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO),
which outlaws certain racketeering activity by or in relation to an en-
terprise, does not require that the enterprise or the racketeering activ-
ity be economically motivated.2 The National Organization For
Women (NOW) and two health clinics that perform abortions
brought suit against anti-abortion activists and organizations under
RICO for "conspir[ing] to shut down abortion clinics through a pat-
tern of racketeering activity."3 Based on statutory interpretation and
legislative history, Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority,
concluded that the unambiguous language of RICO did not require a
defendant to have an economic motive, and therefore a RICO suit
could be brought against abortion protesters who were morally and
religiously motivated.
4
This Note argues that the majority, although it arrived at the cor-
rect resolution, employed inadequate statutory analysis to arrive at its
holding.. The term "enterprise" as used in the statute is ambiguous;
consequently, the Court should have looked for the ordinary meaning
of the term "enterprise" to determine the plain meaning of the stat-
ute. The Court was correct, however, not to judicially impose restric-
tions onto the broad language of RICO based on the legislative history
of the statute, because the legislative history does not show a strong
Congressional intent to require an economic motive under RICO. In
addition, this Note analyzes Justice Souter's treatment of the First
Amendment implications of the majority's decision and suggests fu-
ture applications of RICO.
1 114 S. Ct. 798 (1994).
2 Id. at 806.
3 Id. at 801.




In 1970, Congress enacted the Organized Crime Control Act
(OCCA) .5 Chapter 96 of the OCCA §§ 1961-68, entitled Racketeer
Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO), makes certain racke-
teering activities and conspiracy to commit these racketeering activi-
ties unlawful. 6 These racketeering activities are defined in detail in
§ 1961 (1) of RICO,7 and are often referred to as RICO predicate acts
5 0CCA, Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 922, codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1970).
6 Section 1962(a) reads in part:
It shall be unlawful for any person who has received any income derived, directly or
indirectly, from a pattern of racketeering activity or through collection of an unlawful
debt in which such person has participated as a principal within the meaning of sec-
tion 2, title 18, United States Code, to use or invest, directly or indirectly, any part of
such income, or the proceeds of such income, in acquisition of any interest in, or the
establishment or operation of, any enterprise which is engaged in, or the activities of
which affect, interstate or foreign commerce.
18 U.S.C. § 1962 (1988).
Section 1962(c) makes it "unlawful for any person employed by or associated with any
enterprise engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign commerce, to
conduct or participate, directly or indirectly, in the conduct of such enterprise's affairs
through a pattern of racketeering activity or collection of unlawful debt." Id.
Section 1962(d) states "It Shall be unlawful for any person to conspire to violate any of
the provisions of subsections (a), (b), or (c)." Id.
Section 1961(1) of RICO defines certain offenses and acts considered racketeering
activity; these offenses are referred to as RICO predicate acts. 18 U.S.C. § 1961 (1988).
7 Section 1961(1) defines the following acts as "racketeering activity":
(A) any act or threat involving murder, kidnapping, gambling, arson, robbery, bribery,
extortion, or dealing in narcotic or other dangerous drugs, which is chargeable under
State law and punishable by imprisonment for more than one year; (B) any act which
is indictable under any of the following provisions of title 18, Unites States Code:
Section 201 (relating to bribery), section 224 (relating to sports bribery), sections 471,
472, and 473 (relating to counterfeiting), section 659 (relating to theft from interstate
shipment) if the act indictable under section 659 is felonious, section 664 (relating to
embezzlement from pension and welfare funds), sections 891-894 (relating to extor-
tionate credit transactions), section 1029 (relati[ng] to fraud and related activity in
connection with access devices), section 1084 (relating to the transmission of gam-
bling information), section 1341 (relating to mail fraud), section 1343 (relating to
wire fraud), sections 1461-1465 (relating to obscene matter), section 1503 (relating to
obstruction of justice), section 1510 (relating to obstruction of criminal investiga-
tions), section 1511 (relating to the obstruction of State or local law enforcement),
section 1512 (relating to tampering with a wimess, victim, or an informant), section
1513 (relating to retaliating against a wimess, victim, or an informant), section 1951
(relating to interference with commerce, robbery, or extortion), section 1952 (relat-
ing to racketeering), section 1953 (relating to interstate transportation of wagering
paraphernalia), section 1954 (relating to unlawful welfare fund payments), section
1955 (relating to the prohibition of illegal gambling businesses), section 1956 (relat-
ing to the laundering of monetary instruments), section 1957 (relating to engaging in
monetary transactions in property derived from specified unlawful activity) [,] ... sec-
tion 1958 (relating to use of interstate commerce facilities in the commission of mur-
der-for-hire), sections 2251-2252 (relating to sexual exploitation of children), sections
2312 and 2313 (relating to interstate transportation of stolen motor vehicles), sections
2314 and 2315 (relating to interstate transportation of stolen property), section 2321
(relating to trafficking in certain motor vehicles or motor vehicle parts), sections 2341-
2346 (relating to trafficking in contraband cigarettes), sections 2421-24 (relating to
white slave traffic), (C) any act which is indictable under title 29, United States Code,
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or predicate offenses. To successfully allege a RICO offense, it is also
necessary to prove the existence of an enterprise as described in
§ 1961 (4).8
Although Congress originally enacted OCCA, including RICO, to
"seek the eradication of organized crime in the United States,"9 the
language of RICO is broad and not specifically limited to organized
crime.' 0 Over the years, courts have attempted to interpret the mean-
ing of these general terms to determine the appropriate scope of
RICO.
A. THE HISTORICALLY BROAD INTERPRETATION OF RICO
For years, the United States Supreme Court has given RICO a
broad reading." For example, the Court in United States v. Turkette'
2
refused to limit the scope of RICO to legitimate enterprises, holding
that the general language of § 1961 (4)'s description of enterprise "in-
clude[s] both legitimate and illegitimate enterprises within its
scope."' 3 The defendant in this case was an alleged member of an
illegitimate enterprise involved in drug trafficking, arson, insurance
fraud, bribery, attempted bribery of police officers, and corruption of
the judicial system.' 4 The Court rejected the defendant's argument
"that RICO was intended solely to protect legitimate business enter-
prises from infiltration by racketeers and that RICO does not make
criminal the participation in an association which performs only ille-
gal acts and which has not infiltrated or attempted to infiltrate a legiti-
mate enterprise."' 5
section 186 (dealing with restrictions on payments and loans to labor organizations)
or section 501(c) (relating to embezzlement from union funds), (D) any offense in-
volving fraud connected with a case under title 11, fraud in the sale of securities, or
the felonious manufacture, importation, receiving, concealment, buying, selling, or
otherwise dealing in narcotic or other dangerous drugs, punishable under any law of
the United States, or (E) any act which is indictable under the Currency and Foreign
Transactions Reporting Act.
Id. (footnotes omitted)
8 Section 1961 (4) states that " 'enterprise' includes any individual, partnership, corpo-
ration, association, or other legal entity, and any union or group of individuals associated
in fact although not a legal entity." Id.
9 OCCA, 84 Stat. at 923.
10 H.J. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Tel. Co., 492 U.S. 229, 248 (1989). "The occasion for
Congress' action was the perceived need to combat organized crime. But Congress for
cogent reasons chose to enact a more general statute, one which, although it had organ-
ized crime as its focus, was not limited in application to organized crime." Id.
11 See, e.g., HJ. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Tel. Co., 492 U.S. 229 (1989); Sedima, S.P.R.L
v. Imrex Co., Inc., 473 U.S. 479 (1985); United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576 (1981).
12 452 U.S. 576 (1981).
13 Id. at 580.
14 Id. at 579.
Is Id. at 579-80.
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Instead, the Court interpreted the term "enterprise" broadly.
The Court reasoned that, if Congress had intended enterprise to in-
clude only legitimate enterprises, it "could easily have ... insert[ed] a
single word, 'legitimate." ' 16 Although the Court in Turkette was not
expressly addressing whether RICO requires that the enterprise have
an economic motive, the Court defined enterprise as "an entity,... a
group of persons associated together for a common purpose of engag-
ing in a course of conduct,"17 which does not require an economic
motive. Thus, the Court established precedent for a liberal reading of
RICO, and specifically the term "enterprise."
In a series of decisions following its broad interpretation of RICO
in Turkette, the Supreme Court, as well as the Seventh Circuit, contin-
ued to refuse to judicially legislate restrictions into RICO. Both courts
repeatedly held that RICO was an unambiguous Act and that Con-
gress purposefully employed broad language, that courts should not
construe narrowly.'8 First, in the 1984 case Haroco, Inc. v. American
National Bank and Trust Co. of Chicago,'9 the United States Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit refused to limit the applications of
RICO when it rejected special standing and injury requirements for
civil RICO plaintiffs.20 The defendants were a bank that made loans
to the plaintiff corporations, the officer and director of the bank, and
the parent company of the bank.21 Plaintiffs alleged that defendants
used "the mails in furtherance of the alleged scheme to defraud plain-
tiffs by overstating the prime interest rate."22 Such a fact pattern is
not typical of the organized crime that Congress sought to eradicate
through RICO, and "it does not seem at all likely that Congress antici-
pated the application of civil RICO to improperly calculated interest
charges by a commercial bank."23 Yet, the court concluded that it
would not exclude the defendants' conduct from the reach of RICO.
The court found that since "Congress deliberately chose to employ
broad terms which would defy judicial confinement... it does not
seem fitting for [the court] to attempt to narrow the statute in ways
which are nearly impossible to rationalize merely to exclude subjects
16 Id. at 581.
17 Clark D. Cunningham et al., Plain Meaning and Hard Cases, 103 YALE LJ. 1561, 1594
(1994) (book review) (quoting Turkette, 452 U.S. at 583).
18 See, e.g., H.J. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Tel. Co., 492 U.S. 229 (1989); Sedima,
S.P.R.L., v. Imrex Co., Inc., 473 U.S. 479 (1985); Haroco, Inc. v. American Nat'l Bank and
Trust Co. of Chicago, 747 F.2d 384 (7th Cir. 1984), aftd, 473 U.S. 606 (1985).
19 747 F.2d 384 (7th Cir. 1984), affd, 473 U.S. 606 (1985).
20 Id. at 399.
21 Id. at 385.
22 Id.
23 Id. at 399.
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of this kind."24 The court further explained that, "the fact that RICO
has been applied in situations not expressly anticipated by Congress
does not demonstrate ambiguity. It demonstrates breadth."25
Shortly after Haroco, the Supreme Court rejected a special stand-
ing requirement for civil RICO plaintiffs in Sedima, S.P.RL. v. Imrex
Co., Inc.26 The fact pattern in Sedima also did not involve organized
crime. The dispute arose when ajoint international venture between
the Belgian company, Sedima, and the New York company, Imrex,
went awry.27 Sedima alleged that Imrex committed "violations of
§ 1962(c), based on ... mail and wire fraud"28 when Imrex "pres-
ent[ed] inflated bills, cheating Sedima out of a portion of its proceeds
by collecting for nonexistent expenses."29 The Court rejected the Sec-
ond Circuit's amorphous "organized crime" standing requirement
that demanded a RICO plaintiff to "allege a 'racketeering injury'-an
injury 'different in kind from that occurring as a result of the predi-
cate acts themselves, or not simply caused by the predicate acts, but
also caused by an activity which RICO was designed to deter.'"30 The
Court concluded that courts should not narrow RICO in this way, but
instead should construe it broadly for two reasons.3' First, because
Congress purposely left the language in RICO broad;3 2 and second,
because Congress expressly stated that RICO was to "be liberally con-
strued."33 In addition, the Court agreed with the Seventh Circuit that
"the fact that RICO has been applied in situations not expressly antici-
pated by Congress does not demonstrate ambiguity[,] [but] demon-
strates breadth."3
4
Finally, in H.J. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Telephone Co.,3 5 the
Supreme Court made an express decision not to limit RICO strictly to
organized crime.3 6 In that case, customers of Northwestern Bell Tele-
phone Company filed a class action against "some of the telephone
24 Id. at 398-99.
25 Id. at 398.
26 473 U.S. 479 (1985).
27 Id. at 483-84.
28 Id. at 484.
29 Id.
SO Id. at 485-86,500 (quoting Sedima, S.P.1LL. v. Imrex, Co., Inc., 741 F.2d 482, 496 (2d
Cir. 1984)).
31 Id. at 497-98.
32 Id.
33 Id. at 498 (quoting OCCA, Pub. L. 91-452, § 904(a), 84 Stat. 947 (1970)). RICO
contains a liberal construction provision. OCCA, § 904(a), 84 Stat. 947.
34 Sedima, S.P.RL., 473 U.S. at 499 (quoting Haroco, Inc. v. American Nat'l Bank and
Trust Co. of Chicago, 747 F.2d 384, 398 (7th Cir. 1984), affd, 473 U.S. 606 (1985)).
35 492 U.S. 229 (1989).
36 Id. at 249.
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company's officers and employees, various members of the Minnesota
Public Utilities Commission (MPUC), and other unnamed individuals
and corporations." 37 The telephone customers alleged violations of
RICO based on factual allegations that Northwestern Bell bribed and
illegally influenced the MPUC to "approve rates for the company in
excess of a fair and reasonable amount."38 The Court rejected a nar-
row reading of the phrase "pattern.of racketeering activity," holding
that it does not require proof of "multiple illegal schemes"39 or that
the predicate acts be "indicative of an organized crime perpetrator."
40
Instead, the Court settled on a broad meaning for "pattern of racke-
teering" that requires a "plaintiff or prosecutor [merely to] prove [a]
continuity of racketeering activity, or its threat, simpliciter."41 The
Court referred to the legislative history of OCCA in support of this
broad interpretation. 42 The Court also considered the fact that, in
other sections of OCCA and in other statutes, Congress "enact[ed]
explicit limitations to organized crime"43 and could have easily done
37 Id. at 233.
38 Id. at 233-34.
39 Id. at 234-35 (quoting HJ., Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Tel. Co., 648 F. Supp. 419, 425
(Minn. 1986)).
40 Id. at 244.
41 Id. at 241.
42 Id. at 246-48. In response to complaints about the breadth of OCCA, "the statute's
sponsors made evident that the omission of this limit was no accident, but a reflection of
OCCA's intended breadth." Id. at 246. The Court looked specifically to the following
words of Senator McClellan:
The danger posed by organized crime-type offenses to our society has, of course, pro-
vided the occasion for our examination of the working of our system of criminal jus-
tice. But should it follow . . . that any proposals for action stemming from that
examination be limited to organized crime?
This line of analysis ... is seriously defective in several regards. Initially, it con-
fuses the occasion for reexamining an aspect of our system of criminal justice with the
proper scope of any new principle or lesson derived from that reexamination.
* * *
In addition, the objection confuses the role of the Congress with the role of a
court. Out of a proper sense of their limited lawmaking function, courts ought to
confine their judgments to the facts of the cases before them. But the Congress in
fulfilling its proper legislative role must examine not only individual instances, but
whole problems. In that connection, it has a duty not to engage in piecemeal legisla-
tion. Whatever the limited occasion for the identification of a problem, the Congress
has the duty of enacting a principled solution to the entire problem. Comprehensive
solutions to identified problems must be translated into well integrated legislative
programs.
The objection, moreover, has practical as well as theoretical defects. Even as to
the titles of [the OCCA bill] needed primarily in organized crime cases, there are very
real limits on the degree to which such provisions can be strictly confined to organ-
ized crime cases .... On the other hand, each title ... which is justified primarily in
organized crime prosecutions has been confined to such cases to the maximum de-
gree possible, while preserving the ability to administer the act and its effectiveness as
a law enforcement tool.
Id. at 246-47 (quoting 116 Cong. Rec. 18,913-14 (1970)).
43 Id. at 245. See, e.g., Title VI which "permitted the deposition of a witness to preserve
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the same in RICO, but chose not to do so.44 Further, the Supreme
Court stressed that it is not the job of the courts to judicially legislate
restrictions into RICO.45
B. THE SPLIT AMONG THE CIRCUITS
Despite these decisions establishing a trend of liberal RICO in-
terpretation, a split developed among the courts of appeals on the
issue of whether RICO requires "the racketeering enterprise or the
predicate acts of racketeering [to be] motivated by an economic pur-
pose."4 Both the Second Circuit and the Eighth Circuit maintained
that an economic motive requirement exists in RICO. In contrast, the
Third Circuit held that RICO does not require an economic motive.
1. Second Circuit
The Second Circuit first established the economic motive re-
quirement in United States v. Ivic.4 7 The defendants in Ivic were Croa-
tian terrorists convicted of "conspir[ing] to kill or otherwise injure"
the Secretary General of the Croatian National Congress,48 attempt-
ing to bomb several locations, and "conspir[ing] to transport and util-
ize explosives."49 These acts provided possible predicate offenses for
the RICO count of the indictment-50 The indictment described the
alleged RICO enterprise as a "criminal enterprise" whose "primary ob-
ject... [was] that the defendants would and did use terror, assassina-
tion, bombings, and violence in order to foster and promote their
beliefs and in order to eradicate and injure persons who they per-
ceived as in opposition to their beliefs."51 The court held that RICO
did not apply to these defendants because neither the enterprise nor
testimony for a legal proceeding, upon motion by the Attorney General certifying that 'the
legal proceeding is against a person who is believed to have participated in an organized
criminal activity.'" Id. (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3503(a)). See also Omnibus Crime Control and
Safe Streets Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-351, § 601(b), 82 Stat. 209, which defines "organ-
ized crime" as "the unlawful activities of the members of a highly organized, disciplined
association engaged in supplying illegal goods and services, including but not limited to
gambling, prostitution, loan sharking, narcotics, labor racketeering, and other unlawful
activities of members of such organizations." H.J. Inc., 492 U.S. at 245 (quoting § 601(b),
82 Stat. 209).
44 HJ. Inc., 492 U.S. at 244-45.
45 Id. at 249.
46 NOW v. Scheidler, 114 S. Ct. 798, 801 (1994). No express requirement exists in the
language of RICO, but the courts argued over whether a putative economic motive re-
quirement exists.
47 700 F.2d 51 (2d Cir. 1983).
48 Id. at 53-54.
49 Id. at 54-56.
50 Id. at 54-55.
51 Id. at 58.
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the predicate acts were economically motivated, but instead were po-
litically motivated.
52
The court provided four reasons for requiring an economic mo-
tive.53 First, the court decided that, because the term "enterprise" as
used in subsections 1962(a) and (b) clearly refers to an "organized
profit-seeking venture," it must assume that the term has the same
economic meaning in subsection 1962(c). 54 Second, the court con-
cluded that the ordinary meaning of the words "corrupt" and "racket-
eer influenced" in the title of the statute mandates an economic
motive requirement. 55 Third, the court found that Congress did not
intend RICO to cover non-economic activity because the statement of
findings prefacing OCCA does not cover non-economic activity.56
Thus, the court held it was beyond the purpose of RICO "to pre-
vent[ ] and revers[e] the infiltration of legitimate businesses by organ-
52 Id. at 65.
53 Id. at 60-65.
54 Id. at 60-61. The court based this conclusion on the view that "[wihen the same
word is used in the same section of an act more than once, and the meaning is clear in one
place, it will be assumed to have the same meaning in other places." Id. at 60. The court
cited United States v. Nunez, 573 F.2d 769, 771 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 930 (1978),
as support for this rule of construction.
55 Ivic, 700 F.2d at 61. The court found that the words "have a familiar connotation to
ordinary people as describing money-making activities." Id.
56 Id. at 61-62.
The statement of findings reads:
The Congress finds that (1) organized crime in the United States is a highly sophisti-
cated, diversified, and widespread activity that annually drains billions of dollars from
America's economy by unlawful conduct and the illegal use of force, fraud, and cor-
ruption; (2) organized crime derives a major portion of its power through money
obtained from such illegal endeavors as syndicated gambling, loan sharking, the theft
and fencing of property, the importation and distribution of narcotics and other dan-
gerous drugs, and other forms of social exploitation; (3) this money and power are
increasingly used to infiltrate and corrupt legitimate business and labor unions and to
subvert and corrupt our democratic processes; (4) organized crime activities in the
United States weaken the stability of the Nation's economic system, harm innocent
investors and competing organizations, interfere with free competition, seriously bur-
den interstate and foreign commerce, threaten the domestic security, and undermine
the general welfare of the Nation and its citizens; and (5) organized crime continues
to grow because of defects in the evidence-gathering process of the law inhibiting the
development of the legally admissible evidence necessary to bring criminal and other
sanctions or remedies to bear on the unlawful activities of those engaged in organized
crime and because the sanctions and remedies available to the Government are un-
necessarily limited in scope and impact.
It is the purpose of this Act to seek the eradication of organized crime in the
United States by strengthening the legal tools in the evidence-gathering process, by
establishing new penal prohibitions, and by providing enhanced sanctions and new
remedies to deal with the unlawful activities of those engaged in organized crime.
OCCA, 84 Stat. 922.
Further, the court stated that "Senator McClellan, the principal sponsor of the Organ-
ized Crime Control Act of 1970, made clear on several occasions that the purpose of Title
IX is 'economic' and that the only crimes included in § 1961(1) are those adapted to
'commercial exploitation'." Ivic, 700 F.2d at 63.
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ized crime elements."57 Finally, the court found persuasive the 1981
Justice Department's RICO Guidelines that require an enterprise to
have an economic goal.5 8
In United States v. Bagari,59 the Second Circuit next addressed the
issue of a RICO economic motive requirement. In Bagaric, the court
clarified its holding in Ivic, specifying that the economic motive re-
quirement is sufficiently satisfied if the purpose for committing the
RICO predicate act is economically motivated and not the enterprise
itself.60 The defendants in Bagaric, like those in Ivic, were Croatian
terrorists. However, in addition to their politically-motivated bomb-
ings and murders, the defendants committed murders in an attempt
to extort money "'to further [their] activities."' 61 Thus, the court dis-
tinguished the defendants in Bagaric on the grounds that they were
"'motivated' by political as well as economic goals,"62 whereas the de-
fendants in Ivic were motivated solely by political goals. The court in
Bagaric declined to require the government to prove that the ultimate
purpose of the enterprise is economic, 63 noting that "the Ivic court
nowhere stated ... that economic gain must be the sole motive of
every RICO enterprise."64
To support its version of the economic motive requirement, the
court in Bagaric used two of the same arguments the court in Ivic
used-the meaning of the words in the title Racketeer Influence and
Corrupt Organizations, and RICO's purpose as expressed by Congress
in the statement of findings prefacing RICO. 65 First, the court in
Bagaric found that since the defendants used the very tactics that the
dictionary uses to define "corrupt" and "racketeer,"66 the ordinary
57 Id.
58 Id. at 64. "The Preface to these Guidelines states that RICO is 'most directly ad-
dressed' to the 'infiltration of organized crime into the nation's economy'." Id. (quoting
U.S. DEPT. OFJUSrICE, UNITED STATES ArToRNvs MANuAL (1981). "Guideline VI directs
that '[n] o RICO count of an indictment shall charge the enterprise as a group associated
in fact, unless the association in fact has an ascertainable structure which exists for the
purpose of maintaining operations directed toward an economic goal ....'" Id. (quoting
U.S. DEPT. oFJUSTICE, supra). However, in 1984, after the Second Circuit decided Ivi,
Congress amended the RICO Guidelines to "provide that an association-in-fact enterprise
must be 'directed toward an economic or other identifiable goaL'" NOW v. Scheidler, 114 S.
Ct. 798, 805 (1994) (quoting U.S. DEPT. OFJuaUcE, UNrrED STATES ATroRNEY's MANuAL
§ 9-110.360 (Mar. 9, 1984) (emphasis added)).
59 706 F.2d 42 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 840 (1983).
60 Id. at 53-54.
61 Id. at 53.
62 Id. (emphasis added).
63 Id. at 53-54.
64 Id. at 53.




meanings of "Corrupt" and "Racketeer" encompass "terrorist groups
[like the one in Bagaric,] which finance their violent activities through
extortionate means."67 Second, the court in Bagaric concluded that
"apart from the reference to 'organized crime,'" 68 the purpose of
RICO as expressed in the statement of findings-to stop activities
which "drain[ ] billions of dollars from America's economy by-unlaw-
ful conduct and the illegal use of force, fraud, and corruption"69-
"clearly covers the conduct of' the terrorists in the Bagaric case who
committed extortion to gain money to support their cause.70
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reaffirmed its deci-
sion in Bagaric in United States v. Ferguson.71 In Ferguson, the court reit-
erated that RICO "merely [requires] 'some financial purpose' either
to the criminal enterprise or the acts of racketeering."72 Defendants
were members of "The Family,"73 and "self-professed revolution-
aries"74 who helped a Black Liberation Army leader escape from jail.75
The defendants committed armed robberies "to support enterprise
members and to maintain safe houses."76 Thus, similar to the defend-
ants in Bagaric, the ultimate purpose of the defendants in Ferguson was




The Eighth Circuit, like the Second Circuit, interpreted RICO as
requiring an economic motive. The Eighth Circuit first mentioned an
economic motive requirement in United States v. Anderson.78 The de-
fendants in Anderson were county administrators alleged to have ac-
cepted bribes and kickbacks in a scheme to defraud the citizens of two
counties.79 The court held that the facts of the case did not fall within
67 Id. The court relied on WEBSTER'S NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY (5th ed. 1977),
which defined "corrupt" as "characterized by bribery, the selling of political favors, or
other improper conduct," and which defined "racketeer" as "one who extorts money or
advantages by threats of violence, by blackmail, or by unlawful interference with business
or employment" Bagaric 706 F.2d at 57 n.13 (quoting WEBsrER'S NEW COLLEGATE DIC-
TIONARY (5th ed. 1977)).
68 Bagaric, 706 F.2d at 57 n.13.
69 OCCA, 84 Stat. 922.
70 Bagaric, 706 F.2d at 57 n.13.
71 758 F.2d 843 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 841 (1985).
72 Id. at 853 (quoting Bagaic, 706 F.2d at 55).
73 Ferguson, 758 F.2d at 847.
74 Id. at 853.
75 Id. at 846.
76 Id. at 853.
77 Id.
78 626 F.2d 1358 (8th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 912 (1981).
79 Id. at 1361-62.
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the meaning of the term "enterprise" as described in § 1961(4) of
RICO because the enterprise was not an "association that is substan-
tially different from the acts which form the 'pattern of racketeering
activity.'" 80 The court interpreted the term "enterprise" "to encom-
pass only an association having an ascertainable structure which exists
for the purpose of maintaining operations directed toward an eco-
nomic goal that has an existence that can be defined apart from the
commission of the predicate acts constituting the 'pattern of racke-
teering activity."' 8 Thus, the Eighth Circuit created the Anderson defi-
nition of "enterprise;" however, the court "provide[d] very little
explanation for the 'economic goal' part of [the] definition,"82 merely
referring to the fact that the purpose of RICO is economic.83 More-
over, the economic goal portion of the Anderson definition was "en-
tirely dicta,"8 4 since the defendants in the case unquestionably had an
economic motive for their actions 5 and the court only "set forth th[e]
economic goal requirement as part of its discussion of a distinct enter-,
prise requirement."86 Regardless of these limitations on precedential
value, the Seventh Circuit in United States v. Neapolitan,87 adopted the
Anderson definition of "enterprises," which also laid the foundation for
the subsequent Eighth Circuit decision in United States v. _'ynn.88
In Flynn, the defendant was charged under RICO for "par-
ticipat[ing] in an organization which engaged in a series of violent
crimes in an attempt to obtain and maintain control of various labor
80 Id. at 1365, 1369.
81 Id. at 1872.
82 Cunningham, supra note 17, at 1592 (citation omitted).
83 Id. n.146. "The Anderson court ... quote [d] a law review article by Senator McClel-
Ian, a cosponsor of the Act, and a law review note to the effect that 'the purpose' of RICO
is 'economic.'" Id. (citing Anderson, 626 F.2d at 1368 as quotingJohn L. McClellan, Organ-
ized Crime Control Act (S. 30) or Its Critics: Which Threaten Civil Liberties?, 46 NoTRE DAME L
REv. 55, 161-62 (1970), and Note, Organized Crime and the Infiltration of Legitimate Business:
Civil Remediesfor "Criminal Activity," 124 U. PA. L. REv. 192, 222 (1975)).
84 See Cunningham, supra note 17, at 1592.
85 NOW v. Scheidler, 968 F.2d 612, 627 (7th Cir. 1992).
86 NOW v. Scheidler, 765 F. Supp. 987, 942 (N.D. I1. 1991).
87 791 F.2d 489 (7th Cir.), cert. denid, 479 U.S. 939 (1986). The Seventh Circuit hold-
ing in Neapolitan, like the Eighth Circuit's decision in Anderson, "distinguished between the
racketeering acts and the enterprise." NOW, 968 F.2d at 627 (citing Neapolitan, 791 F.2d at
500). The case involved "police officers [who] took bribes from car thieves, and were
charged with conducting the sheriff's office (the enterprise) through a pattern of racke-
teering activity," and also the "car thieves themselves [who] operated a large scale 'chop
shop,' which was allegedly the RICO enterprise." Id. Whether the defendants were moti-
vated by financial gain was not an issue in the case because it was obvious that they were.
Id. However, in concluding that the racketeering acts must be separate from the enter-
prise, the Neapolitan court specifically adopted the Anderson definition of "enterprise" con-
taining the "economic motive" language. Neapolitan, 791 F.2d at 500.
88 852 F.2d 1045 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 974 (1988).
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unions and to retaliate against leaders of rival groups, organizations
and families for acts committed against the enterprise."89 The de-
fendant "argue[d] that the evidence failed to show that his activities
promoted his economic interests in the enterprise." 90 Based on the
Anderson definition of "enterprise," the court specifically held that
RICO requires that "an enterprise ... be directed toward an economic
goal."91 The enterprise at issue satisfied this requirement because its
activities were directed towards controlling labor unions.92 Thus, the
court sustained the RICO convictions.
93
3. Third Circuit
In contrast to the Second and Eighth Circuits, the Third Circuit
determined that RICO does not require an economic motive. The
Third Circuit in Northeast Women's Center, Inc. v. McMonag0 4 held that
where economic motive is not necessary to commit the predicate of-
fense, there is no separate economic requirement under RICO. 95 In
this case, a women's health center brought a RICO action "against a
group of anti-abortion activists."96 As the RICO predicate offense, the
clinic alleged acts of extortion in violation of the Hobbs Act, 18 U.S.C.
§ 1951, 97 which is an offense that does not require an economic mo-
tive. The court concluded that, if the elements of the RICO predicate
offense have been satisfied, RICO requires no additional proof of an
economic motive.98 Specifically, the court found the defendants' ac-
tions for which the jury convicted them were the very acts the statutes
proscribed and that the defendants were not immunized from punish-
89 Id. at 1046.




94 868 F.2d 1342 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 901 (1989).
95 Id.
96 Id. at 1345.
97 Id. at 1348. Section 1961 (1) (B) defines racketeering activity as "any act which is
indictable under any of the following provisions of titie 18, United States Code: ... section
1951 .... " 18 U.S.C. § 1961.
18 U.S.C. § 1951(a) reads:
Whoever in any way or degree obstructs, delays, or affects commerce or the movement
of any article or commodity in commerce, by robbery or extortion or attempts or
conspires so to do, or commits or threatens physical violence to any person or prop-
erty in furtherance of a plan or purpose to do anything in violation of this section shall
be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than twenty years, or both.
18 U.S.C. § 1951 (1988).
Section 1951(b) (2) defines extortion as "the obtaining of property from another, with
his consent, induced by wrongful use of actual or threatened force, violence, or fear, or
under color of official right." Id.
98 Northeast Women's Ctr., Inc., 868 F.2d at 1348.
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ment because they were motivated by their political beliefs.99
The United States Supreme Court finally resolved this conflict
among the federal courts of appeals in NOW v. Scheidler.00
III. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Pro-Life Action Network (PLAN) is a nationwide coalition of anti-
abortion activists and organizations 01 pursuing a goal to "shut down
[abortion] clinics and persuade women not to have abortions." 02 To
further this purpose, these anti-abortion activists and organizations
committed the following unlawful acts: organized "blitzes" on clinics,
in which protesters blockaded the clinics, disabled the locks to the
clinics with glue, and locked themselves to the clinic doors; led an
invasion of a Florida clinic in which protesters injured the clinic ad-
ministrator and another woman and destroyed clinic property;
threatened those who conduct business with the clinics; and main-
tained connections with arsonists who have fire-bombed clinics. 03
Further, several of the protesters allegedly stole fetal remains from a
medical testing laboratory named Vital-Med Laboratories, which re-
portedly was a participant in this scheme. 0 4
In response to these and similar acts by PLAN and its members,
the National Organization for Women (NOW) and two health care
centers, Delaware Women's Health Organization, Inc. (DWHO) and
Summit Women's Health Organization, Inc. (SWHO),105 filed a suit
in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois
against the named members of PLAN 10 6 (hereinafter "protesters")
and Vital-Med Laboratories. 107 The suit alleged that the protesters,
99 Id.
100 NOW v. Scheidler, 114 S. Ct. 798, 802 (1994).
101 Joseph Scheidler, John Patrick Ryan, Randall Terry, Andrew Scholberg, Conrad
Wojnar, Timothy Murphy, Monica Migliorino, Pro-Life Action League, Inc., Pro-life Direct
Action League, Inc., Project Life, and Operation Rescue are all members of PLAN. United
States Supreme Court Brief for Petitioner at 4-5, NOW v. Scheidler, 114 S. Ct. 798 (1994)
(No. 92-780).
102 NOW, 114 S. Ct. at 801.
103 NOW v. Scheidler, 968 F.2d 612, 615-16 (7th Cir. 1992).
104 Id. The protesters clearly committed the acts; the only issues before the court were
whether the acts constituted stealing as alleged by NOW, Delaware Women's Health Or-
ganization, Inc., and Summit Women's Health Organization, Inc. and whether the lab was
part of the scheme.
105 Plaintiffs intended the suit to be a class action on behalf of NOW and its women
members, other women who use or may use the services of the targeted health centers, and
Delaware Women's Health Organization, Inc., Summit Women's Health Organization,
Inc., and similarly targeted clinics. However, the district court dismissed the class certifica-
tion motion upon granting defendant's motion to dismiss the suit. Id. at 615 n.3.
106 See supra note 101.
107 NOW 968 F.2d at 615.
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through their actions, "restrained trade in violation of section one of
the Sherman [Antitrust] Act." 08 In addition, DWHO and SWHO 0 9
alleged that the protesters "were members of a nationwide conspiracy
to shut down abortion clinics through a pattern of racketeering activ-
ity"110 in violation of §§ 1962(a),' 1 ' 1962(c), 112 and 1962(d) 113 of
RICO.
The district court dismissed the suit pursuant to Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 12(b) (6) "for failure to state a claim upon which relief
may be granted."" 4 The district court granted dismissal for four rea-
sons: First, in Eastern R.R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight,
Inc.,"15 the United States Supreme Court held that the Sherman Act
does not apply to political activity aimed at petitioning the govern-
ment. 1 6 Thus, the district court concluded that because the protes-
ters' alleged activities "involve [d] political opponents, not commercial
competitors, and political objectives, not marketplace goals,""17 the
Sherman Act was inapplicable to the present matter. Second, the
court dismissed the § 1962 (a) RICO claim because PLAN's alleged in-
come came from voluntary donations that "in no way were derived
from the pattern of racketeering alleged" by the clinics and required
by § 1962(a)."18 The court found that "[wihile supporters may have
108 NOW v. Scheidler, 765 F. Supp. 937, 939 (N.D. Ill. 1991). Section 1 of the Sherman
Antitrust Act states:
Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in re-
straint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, is
declared to be illegal. Every person who shall make any contract or engage in any
combination or conspiracy hereby declared to be illegal shall be deemed guilty of a
felony, and, on conviction thereof, shall be punished by fine not exceeding one mil-
lion dollars if a corporation, or, if any other person, one hundred thousand dollars, or
by imprisonment not exceeding three years, or by both said punishments, in the dis-
cretion of the court.
15 U.S.C. § 1 (1988).
109 Only DWHO and SWHO sued under RICO. NOW v. Scheidler, 114 S. Ct. 798, 802
(1994).
3 10 Id. at 801. The activities allegedly included extortion in violation of the Hobbs Act,
18 U.S.C. § 1951. Id.; see supra note 97. In support of this allegation, DWHO and SWHO
claimed that the protesters "conspired to use threatened or actual force, violence or fear to
induce clinic employees, doctors, and patients to give up theirjobs, give up their economic
right to practice medicine, and give up their right to obtain medical services at the clin-
ics." NOW, 114 S. Ct. at 801-02. Further, the conspiracy allegedly resulted in injury to the
plaintiffs' "business and/or property interests." Id. at 802.
111 See supra note 6.
112 See supra note 6. PLAN "constitute[d] the alleged racketeering 'enterprise' for pur-
poses of § 1962(c)." NOW, 114 S. Ct. at 802.
113 See supra note 6.
114 NOW v. Scheidler, 765 F. Supp. 937, 939 (N.D. Ill. 1991).
115 365 U.S. 127 (1961).
116 Id.
117 NOW v. Scheidler, 114 S. Ct. 798, 802 (1994) (quoting NOW, 765 F. Supp. at 941).
118 Id. (quoting NOW, 765 F. Supp. at 941).
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contributed in order to promote the extortionate activities of defend-
ants,"119 the "supporters of defendant organizations were not ex-
torted, either directly or indirectly, into contributing to the
organizations." 120 Third, the district court held that § 1962(c) of
RICO requires an economic motive "to the extent that some profit-
generating purpose must be alleged in order to state a RICO
claim."121 The court found that the protesters' acts were not moti-
vated by economics, but by moral and political goals. Thus, the court
dismissed the § 1962(c) claim.122 Finally, the court dismissed the
§ 1962 (d) conspiracy claim because it was dependent on whether the
plaintiffs prevailed in the other two RICO claims. 123 And once the
court dismissed all of the federal claims, the pendent state claims
lacked jurisdiction. 124
The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit af-
firmed the district court's decision, 12 5 "despite the reprehensible na-
ture of the defendants' activities." 126 The court of appeals rejected
the district court's use of NoerMotorFreight, Inc. in dismissing the anti-
trust claims. 127 Instead, the court of appeals found that the legislative
and economic history of the Sherman Act showed that "the Sherman
Act ... was intended to prevent business competitors from making
restraining arrangements for their own economic advantage." 128
Thus, the court held that, because the "[d]efendants [were] not in-
volved in business, and [had] no ability to concentrate economic
power," the Sherman Act did not apply to and did not prohibit the
activities alleged by NOW, DWHO, and SWHO. 129
The court of appeals agreed with the district court's second ra-
tionale for dismissing the case, finding that § 1962(c) of RICO con-
tains an economic motive. The court of appeals began its analysis by
noting that in United States v. Neapolitan30 it had adopted the Anderson
definition of enterprise that requires an economic motive.' 3 ' How-
19 NOW, 765 F. Supp. at 941.
120 Id.
121 Id. at 943.
122 Id. at 944.
123 NOW v. Scheidler, 114 S. Ct. 798, 802 (1994). Section 1962(d) makes it "unlawful
for any person to conspire to violate any of the provisions of subsections (a), (b), or (c),"
of § 1962. 18 U.S.C. § 1962 (footnote omitted).
124 NOW, 765 F. Supp. at 944-45.
125 NOW v. Scheidler, 968 F.2d 612 (7th Cir. 1992).
126 Id.
127 Id. at 621.
128 Id.
129 Id.
130 791 F.2d 489 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 939 (1986).
131 NOW, 968 F.2d at 626; see supra text accompanying note 81.
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ever, because "economic motive was not an issue in either Neapolitan
or Anderson,"13 2 the court of appeals went on to examine the reason-
ing behind the Second Circuit's holdings in Ivic, Bagaric, and Fergu-
son.'3 3 The court concluded that the economic motive requirement
established in this line of cases was warranted, 34 despite the Seventh
Circuit's traditionally broad interpretation of RICO,' 3 5 and despite
the fact that "'the breadth of the statute ... was the result of deliber-
ate policy choices on the part of Congress."
' 36
The court of appeals provided several reasons justifying its deci-
sion that an economic motive requirement was warranted. First, fol-
lowing the analysis of the Second Circuit in Ivic,137 the court of
appeals argued that the "use of the term enterprise in §§ 1962(a) and
(b) conveys a restriction to economic entities."138 The court bolstered
the analysis in Ivic by quoting the Supreme Court's comment in
Sedima that "'[the Court] should not lightly infer that Congress in-
tended the term ["violation" in RICO] to have wholly different mean-
ings in neighboring subsections." ' 139 Second, the court stated that
requiring an economic motive should not be troubling because the
requirement is not "vague" and "amorphous."1 40 In addition, the
court of appeals argued that by requiring an economic motive it is not
"adding elements to the [RICO] offense, but merely fleshing out the
definitions of those elements." 141 Furthermore, the court of appeals
believed that the Supreme Court's consistent referral to "businesses"
in its discussions of RICO 142 "bolster[ed] [the court of appeals'] con-
132 Now, 968 F.2d at 627; see supra note 87.
133 Now, 968 F.2d at 627-29.
'34 Id. at 629.
135 Id.; see, e.g., Morgan v. Bank of Waukegan, 804 F.2d 970, 975-76 (7th Cir. 1986);
Schacht v. Brown, 711 F.2d 1343 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1002 (1983).
136 NOW, 968 F.2d at 629 (quoting Haroco, Inc. v. American Nat'l Bank and Trust Co. of
Chicago, 747 F.2d 384, 398-99 (7th Cir. 1984), affd, 473 U.S. 606 (1985)).
137 See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
138 NOW, 968 F.2d at 629.
'39 Id. at 627 (quoting Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., Inc., 473 U.S. 479, 489 (1985)).
140 Id. The court noted that in Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., Inc., 473 U.S. 479 (1985),
the Supreme Court was troubled by the vagueness of a racketeering injury requirement,
NOW, 968 F.2d at 629 (citing Sedima, 473 U.S. at 494-95), which the Second Circuit had
read into RICO and which the Supreme Court ultimately rejected. See supra text accompa-
nying note 30.
141 NOW, 968 F.2d at 629. The court of appeals made this argument in response to the
holding in Sedima that the "courts should not graft on additional elements" to RICO. Id.
(citing Sedima, 473 U.S. at 497).
142 The court of appeals provided the following quote for support
Congress wanted to reach both 'legitimate' and 'illegitimate' enterprises. Legitimate
businesses enjoy neither an inherent incapacity for criminal activity nor immunity
from its consequences; and, as a result, § 1964(c)'s use against respected businesses
allegedly engaged in a pattern of specifically identified criminal conduct is hardly a
sufficient reason for assuming that the provision is being misconstrued.
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clusion that non-economic crimes committed in furtherance of non-
economic motives are not within the ambit of RICO." 143 Finally, the
court felt the economic motive requirement had support in the deci-
sions in Anderson, Neapolitan, and Flynn.'" Based on the above consid-
erations, the court of appeals held that RICO does not apply to
situations where neither the enterprise nor the predicate acts are eco-
nomically motivated.'4 5
After finding that RICO requires an economic motive, the court
of appeals rejected petitioners' arguments that the increased costs to
the clinics as a result of the protesters' actions satisfied the economic
requirement 46 The court "refuse[d] to equate [economic] effect
with the economic motive required." 47 The court also found that the
contributions PLAN received incidentally from its actions did not
show that PLAN had an economic motive.'1 4  Moreover, the court of
appeals concurred with the district court's disposition of the
§§ 1962(a) and (d) RICO claims.' 4 9 NOW, DWHO, and SWHO,
appealed.
Recognizing a developing conflict among the courts of appeals,
the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari' 50 to "determine
whether RICO requires proof that either the racketeering enterprise
or the predicate acts of racketeering were motivated by an economic
purpose.
" 15 1
IV. SUMMARY OF OPINIONS
A. MAJORITY OPINION
Writing for a unanimous Court, Chief Justice Rehnquist con-
cluded that RICO does not require proof that "the racketeering enter-
prise or the predicate acts of racketeering were motivated by an
economic purpose. " 1 52 The majority found that neither the language
Id. (quoting H.J. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Tel. Co., 492 U.S. 229, 249 (1989)).
143 Id.
14 4 1&
145 Id. at 629-0.
146 Id. at 630.
147 Id.
148 Id.
149 NOW v. Scheidler, 114 S. Ct. 798, 802 (1994).
150 NOW v. Scheidler, 113 S. Ct. 2958 (1993).
151 NOW, 114 S. Ct. at 801.
152 Id. The court also addressed the threshold question of whether DWHO and SWHO
had standing to bring their RICO claims and concluded that they did. Id. The court held
that, because the district court had dismissed the petitioners' claim at the pleading stage,
petitioners would have standing and their complaint would be sustained "if relief could be
granted 'under any set of facts that could be proved consistent with the allegations.'" Id. at
803 (quoting Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73 (1984)). The court found that
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of RICO nor its legislative history requires an economic motive.153
Therefore, the Court concluded that DWHO and SWHO may main-
tain their RICO claims if the protesters "conducted the enterprise
through a pattern of racketeering activity." 15 4
Examining the language of RICO, Chief'Justice Rehnquist found
that neither § 1962(c) nor § 1961, which define the terms used in
RICO, indicate that RICO requires an economic motive.' 55 The Chief
Justice paid special attention to the § 1962(c) phrase, "any enterprise
engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign com-
merce," because that language "comes the closest of any language in
subsection (c) to suggesting a need for an economic motive."'
56
Based on Webster's Third New International Dictionary's definition of
the word "affect"'-"to have a detrimental influence on"' 57-ChiefJus-
tice Rehnquist argued that a RICO enterprise does not have to have
"its own profit-seeking motives" to satisfy § 1962(c). 158 Surely, an en-
terprise could "have a detrimental influence on interstate or foreign
commerce without having its own profit-seeking motives." 159
Consistent with the definitional analysis, Chief Justice Rehnquist
rejected the court of appeals' view that the economic use of the word
"enterprise" in subsections 1962(a) and (b) implies an economic mo-
tive requirement for the enterprise in subsection (c).160 According to
Chief Justice Rehnquist, the rule the court of appeals relied upon-
that "'[a court] should not lightly infer that Congress intended' terms
'to have wholly different meanings in neighboring subsections'"'
6 -
does not apply to the term "enterprise" in subsections 1962 (a), (b),
and (C). 1 6 2 The Chief Justice found this to be the case because "the
term 'enterprise' in subsections (a) and (b) plays a different role in
the following allegations incorporated into the petitioners' § 1962(c) claim satisfy this stan-
dard: "respondents conspired to use force to induce clinic staff and patients to stop work-
ing and obtain medical services elsewhere," Id.; the "conspiracy 'has injured the business
and/or property interests of the' petitioners," Id. (quoting App. 66, Second Amended
Complaint at 72,1 104); and "respondent Scheidler threatened DWHO's clinic administra-
tor with reprisals if she refused to quit her job at the clinic." Id. (quoting 66 App. Second
Amended Complaint at 68, 1 9 8(g)).
153 Id. at 804, 806.
154 Id. at 806.
155 Id. at 804.
156 Id. (emphasis added).
157 WEBs-rER'S THiRD NEW INTERNATIoNAL DicrIoNARY 35 (1969).
158 NOW, 114 S. Ct. at 804.
159 Id.
160 Id.
161 NOW v. Scheidler, 968 F.2d 612, 627 (1992) (quoting Sedima, S.P.1LL v. Imrex Co.,
Inc., 473 U.S. 479, 489 (1985)).
162 NOW, 114 S. Ct. at 804.
1206 [Vol. 85
RICO
the structure of those subsections than it does in subsection (c)."163
In subsections (a) and (b), the enterprise is "something acquired
through the use of illegal activities or by money obtained from illegal
activities," 164 and thus is the "victim of unlawful activity."'1 65 Such an
enterprise "may very well be a 'profit-seeking' entity."1 66 In contrast,
in subsection (c) the term "enterprise" refers to "the vehicle through
which the unlawful pattern of racketeering activity is committed.' 67
Thus, ChiefJustice Rehnquist concluded that, because the enterprise
in subsection (c) is not being acquired, the enterprise "need not have
a property interest that can be acquired nor an economic motive for
engaging in illegal activity" as is likely required with an enterprise in
subsections (a) and (b). 168
The majority also examined the significance of language absent
from RICO in determining that the language of the statute does not
imply an economic motive requirement. 69 Chief Justice Rehnquist
referred to United States v. Turkette170 for the rationale that, where
"Congress could easily have narrowed the sweep of the term 'enter-
prise' by inserting a single word," but did not, the limitation most
likely does not exist and courts should not infer it.171 Applying this
rationale to the case at bar, the majority found as persuasive evidence
against requiring an economic motive' 72 the fact that "Congress has
not, either in the definitional section or in the operative language,
required that an 'enterprise' in § 1962(c) have an economic
motive."17a
Moreover, the majority examined the legislative history of RICO
relied upon by the defendants, and concluded that the legislative his-
tory does not indicate Congress intended to proscribe an economic
motive requirement. 174 Defendants Scheidler, Scholberg, and Pro-
Life Action League, Inc. based one legislative history argument on
"the principle of selection by which RICO's sponsors included and




166 Id. However, all that these subsections mandate is that the enterprise "be an entity
that was acquired through illegal activity or by money generated from illegal activity." Id.
167 Id.
168 Id.
169 Id. at 805.
170 452 U.S. 576 (1981). See supra text accompanying note 16.
171 NOW 114 S. Ct. at 805.
172 Id.
17" Id.
174 Id. at 805-06.
175 Brief for Respondent at 23, NOW v. Scheidler, 114 S. Ct. 798 (1994) (No. 92-780).
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defendants argued that RICO does not cover their activities because
the legislative history shows that Congress intentionally based the se-
lection of predicate offenses on the principal of "commercial exploita-
tion" to "preclude .. .application [of RICO] to political and social
protest."176 Defendants Terry, Project Life, and Operation Rescue
further argued that the purpose of RICO as shown by the legislative
history, and acknowledged by the Court in previous cases, "was to
strike at the 'source of economic power' of organized crime,"'177 and
thus RICO does not apply to the defendants' protest activities. 178 De-
spite these arguments, the Court found that "the parties' submissions
respecting legislative history" did not clearly express an intent on the
part of Congress to require an economic motive. Thus, Chief Justice
Rehnquist held that a construction other than the one dictated by the
unambiguous language of the statute was unwarranted. 179
Along these same lines, the majority held that the rule of lenity in
criminal cases should not control the result of the case because "the
rule of lenity only applies when an ambiguity is present [in the stat-
ute] ."180 According to the rule of lenity, when an ambiguity exists in
the language of a criminal statute, the court should interpret the lan-
guage narrowly,181 to protect due process concerns by "giv[ing] poten-
tial criminal defendants fair warning that their conduct may be
punished."182 Although intended for criminal cases, the rule could
potentially apply in a civil RICO suit to ambiguous language in
§ 1962(c), since criminal RICO penalties, as well as civil penalties,
stem from the offenses contained in § 1962.183 The majority, how-
ever, found that there was not sufficient ambiguity in the language of
RICO "to invoke the rule of lenity"184 since "'the fact that RICO has
been applied in situations not expressly anticipated by Congress does
not demonstrate ambiguity. It demonstrates breadth."' 185
In reaching its decision, the majority attacked the Second Cir-
176 Id. at 23, 31-35.
177 Respondent's Brief at 18, NOW (No. 92-780) (quoting Russello v. United States, 464
U.S. 16, 27 (1983) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)).
178 Respondent's Brief at 18-19, NOW (No. 92-780).
179 NOW v. Scheidler, 114 S. Ct. 798, 806 (1994).
180 Id.
181 Matthew C. Blickensderfer, Note, Unleashing RICO, 17 HARv. J.L & PUB. POL'v 867,
877 (1994).
182 Id.; see also Bryan T. Camp, Dual Constnction of RICO: The Road Not Taken In Reves, 51
WASH. & LEE L. REv. 61, 90 (1994).
183 Blickensderfer, supra note 181, at 877-78.
184 NOW, 114 S. CL at 806.
185 Id. (quoting Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 499 (1985) and Haroco,
Inc. v. American Nat'l. Bank & Trust Co. of Chicago, 747 F.2d 384, 398 (7th Cir. 1984),
aff'd, 473 U.S. 606 (1985)).
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cuit's reasoning in United States v. Bagaic,18 6 which the court of ap-
peals relied upon for its determination that RICO contairis an
economic motive requirement.' 8 7 Chief Justice Rehnquist disagreed
with the Second Circuit's conclusion in Bagaric that the words in the
statement of congressional findings prefacing RICO, "refer[ing] to
the activities of groups that 'drain[ ] billions of dollars from America's
economy by unlawful conduct and the illegal use of force, fraud, and
corruption,"' 18 8 condemn only economically motivated activities.' 8 9
The ChiefJustice found that these words also condemn activities that
"may not benefit the protesters financially but still may drain money
from the economy by harming businesses." 190 Moreover, ChiefJustice
Rehnquist found that reliance on the congressional statement was
particularly weak support for an economic motive requirement con-
sidering that, as the Court stated in H.J. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Tele-
phone Co.,191 Congress purposely chose to enact a general statute even
though combating organized crime was its main purpose.
192
The majority also attacked the court of appeals' reliance on the
Department ofJustice's 1981 guidelines for RICO prosecutions, which
the Second Circuit also found persuasive in Ivic.193 To charge an asso-
ciation as an enterprise in a RICO indictment, the 1981 Guidelines
required that "the association exist[ ] 'for the purpose of maintaining
operations directed toward an economic goal .... ,"194 In 1984, how-
ever, the Department of Justice amended the guidelines, now requir-
ing that an "association-in-fact enterprise" as described in § 1961 (4) 195
be "directed toward an economic or other identifiable goal."196 Thus,
Chief Justice Rehnquist dismissed the argument that the Guidelines
require an economic motive.
Finally, Chief Justice Rehnquist "decline[d] to address the First
Amendment question argued by [the protesters] and the amici,"'
97
186 706 F.2d 42 (2d Cir.), cert. denied; 464 U.S. 840 (1983); see supra text accompanying
note 65.
187 See supra note 183 and accompanying text.
188 NOW, 114 S. Ct. at 805 (quoting Bagari, 706 F.2d at 57 n.13 as quoting OCCA, 84
Stat. 922).
189 Id. at 805.
190 Id.
19 492 U.S. 229 (1989).
192 NOW, 114 S. Ct. at 805 (quoting H.. Inc., 492 U.S. at 248).
193 Id. at 805.
194 Id.
195 Section 1961(4) describes "enterprise" as "any individual, partnership, corporation,
association, or other legal entity, and any union or group of individuals associated in fact
although not a legal entity." 18 U.S.C. § 1961 (emphasis added).
196 NOW, 114 S. Ct. at 805 (quoting U.S. DEPT. OFJuSTICE, UNrrED STATES ATrORNEY'S
MANUAL § 9-110.360 (Mar. 9, 1984) (emphasis added)).
197 Id. at 806 n.6. The protesters and amici were concerned that the "application of
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because the constitutional argument was "directed almost entirely to
the nature of [the protesters'] activities, rather than to the construc-
tion of RICO."1 98 In addition, none of the parties made a constitu-
tional argument as to the proper construction of RICO in the court of
appeals, and the Supreme Court did not grant certiorari regarding
that issue.19 9
In sum, the majority disagreed with the court of appeals' inter-
pretation of the language of RICO. Instead, the majority believed that
the unambiguous language of RICO warranted a finding that RICO
does not contain an economic motive requirement. Accordingly,
Chief Justice Rehnquist rejected all legislative history and other Con-
gressional intent arguments that the court of appeals and the protes-
ters made in support of an economic motive requirement.
B. JUSTICE SOUTER'S CONCURRENCE
Justice Souter agreed with the majority that RICO does not con-
tain an economic motive requirement.2 0 0 However, Justice Souter felt
it necessary to address two additional points regarding the First
Amendment issues raised by the protesters and amici. First, he con-
cluded that the First Amendment does not mandate an economic mo-
tive requirement.2 0 1 Second, he explained why the majority decision
"does not bar First Amendment challenges to RICO's application in
particular cases."
20 2
Justice Souter rejected the protesters and amici's arguments that
courts should construe RICO as requiring an economic motive to
avoid "First Amendment issues that could arise from allowing RICO to
be applied to protest organizations." 20 3 Justice Souter stated that such
a statutory construction "applies only when the meaning of a statute is
in doubt," and did not apply in the instant case because the language
of RICO is unambiguous. 20 4 Justice Souter also concluded that an
economic motive requirement would result in both overprotection
and underprotection of First Amendment concerns and would not ad-




200 Id. at 806 (Souter, J., concurring). Justice Kennedy joined justice Souter's opinion.
201 Id. (Souter, J., concurring).
202 Id. (Souter, j., concurring).
203 Id. (Souter, J., concurring).
204 Id. at 806-07 (SouterJ., concurring). In prior cases, the Court has "interpreted...
generally applicable statutes so as to avoid First Amendment problems." Id. at 806 (Souter,
J., concurring). See, e.g., Eastern R.R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc.,
365 U.S. 127, 138 (1961); Lucas v. Alexander, 279 U.S. 573, 579 (1929).
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equately protect First Amendment interests. 205
Furthermore, Justice Souter stated that an "economic-motive re-
quirement is ... unnecessary" because "free-speech claims may be
raised and addressed in individual RICO cases as they arise."20 6 As
Justice Souter suggested, RICO defendants might raise the First
Amendment as grounds for dismissal and as a defense. 207 Further-
more, if a RICO defendant is "otherwise engag[ed] in protected ex-
pression," the First Amendment may limit the amount of relief
awarded to the plaintiff, even if a RICO violation is validly estab-
lished.20 8 Thus, Justice Souter found that First Amendment chal-
lenges are not barred.
In conclusion, Justice Souter recognized the need to take "notice
that RICO actions could deter protected advocacy" and "caution[ed]
courts applying RICO to bear in mind the First Amendment interests
that could be at stake."
209
V. ANALYSIS
This Note argues that although the majority's holding that RICO
applies to non-economically motivated enterprises was correct, the
Court based its conclusion on inadequate considerations. The major-
ity failed to notice the ambiguity in the term "enterprise" and should
have looked to the ordinary meaning of "enterprise" to arrive at a
plain meaning for the term as used in the statute. In addition, this
Note concludes that the majority correctly found that Congress had
no clear intent contrary to the plain meaning of the language of the
statute. Finally, this Note argues that Justice Souter accurately ad-
dressed the First Amendment issues raised by the respondents and
amici.
A. THE MEANING OF THE TERM "ENTERPRISE"
In concluding that the statutory language of RICO requires no
economic motive for the enterprise, the majority did not fully inquire
into the meaning of the term "enterprise." Instead, Chief Justice
205 NOW, 114 S. Ct. at 807 (Souter, J., concurring). According to Justice Souter, over-
protection of First Amendment interests would result since an economic motive require-
ment "would keep RICO from reaching ideological entities whose members commit acts of
violence we need not fear chilling," and underprotection would result because "entities
engaging in vigorous but fully protected expression might fail the proposed economic-
motive test (for even protest movements need money) and so be left exposed to harassing
RICO suits." Id.
206 Id. (SouterJ., concurring).
207 Id. (SouterJ., concurring).
208 Id. (Souter, J., concurring).
209 Id. (Souter, J., concurring).
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Rehnquist focused on the conduct of the enterprise described in
§ 1962(c).2 10 Finding that a non-economically motivated entity's ac-
tivities could "affect[ ] interstate or foreign commerce,"21' the Court
concluded that § 1962(c) provided no indication of an economic mo-
tive requirement.2 12 On this basis, the Court found that the language
of RICO is unambiguous and, in the absence of a clear Congressional
intent to the contrary, judged the inquiry into an economic motive
complete. 2
13
The Court's analysis, however, was incomplete. Although a non-
economically motivated entity may engage in activities affecting inter-
state or foreign commerce, it does not follow that the term "enter-
prise" includes non-economically motivated entities. The Court did
not explore the possibility that an economic motive requirement
could exist within the meaning of the term "enterprise" itself 214 Fur-
ther, in contrast to the view of the Court that the language of the
statute is unambiguous, the split among the circuits between those
who accept the Anderson definition 215 of "enterprise" and those who
accept the Turkette definition,21 6 shows the exact meaning of "enter-
prise" is in fact ambiguous. 217 To accurately resolve this conflict about
the plain meaning of the statute, the Court first should have looked to
the ordinary meaning of the term "enterprise."218 Then, if an analysis
210 The Court looked to the language of subsection (c) which states that an enterprise
can be something "the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign commerce." 18 U.S.c.
§ 1962(c). The Court then found that an enterprise does not have to have an economic
motive to affect interstate commerce. NOW, 114 S. CL at 804. Thus, the Court concluded
that "nowhere in either § 1962(c), or in the RICO definitions in § 1961, is there any indica-
tion that an economic motive is required." Id.
211 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c).
212 NOW, 114 S. Ct. at 804-05.
213 Id. at 806.
214 At least one definition of enterprise found in WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL
DICIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE-UNABRIDGED 757 (Merriam Webster Inc. 1986)
defines enterprise as "a unit of economic organization or activity (as a factory, a farm, a
mine); esp: a business organization: FIRM, COMPANY." See Cunningham et al., supra note
17, at 1590-91.
215 The court in Anderson defined enterprise as "an association having an ascertainable
structure which exists for the purpose of maintaining operations directed toward an eco-
nomic goal that has an existence that can be defined apart from the commission of the
predicate acts constituting the 'pattern of racketeering activity.'" United States v. Ander-
son, 626 F.2d 1358, 1372 (8th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 912 (1981).
216 The court in Turkette defined enterprise as "an entity, for present purposes a group
of persons associated together for a common purpose of engaging in a course of conduct."
United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 583 (1981).
217 If the definition was clear, the Supreme Court would not have to grant certiorari to
determine the plain meaning of the language of the statute. Cunningham et al., supra
note 17, at 1564.
218 Id. at 1564-65 (quoting Chisom v. Roemer, 111 S. Ct. 2354, 2369 (1991) (ScaliaJ.,
dissenting)); see also Smith v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 2050, 2054 (1993); Russello v. United
1212 [Vol. 85
1995]
of the legislative history showed no "clear indication that some permis-
sible meaning other than the ordinary one applie[d]," the Court
should have held the inquiry complete and adopted the ordinary
meaning.21
9
The Court began to do this by looking at § 1961(4) "Definitions"
to see if Congress provided a clear meaning of enterprise. 220 The
Court concluded that the § 1961(4) definition of enterprise as "any
individual, partnership, corporation, association, or other legal entity,
and any union or group of individuals associated in fact although not
a legal entity,"22 1 does not indicate an economic motive. 222 A more
thorough examination of the language of § 1961(4), however, reveals
that § 1961(4) does not define the term enterprise 22 3-"it does not
state necessary and sufficient conditions for something to be an enter-
prise"224-but merely instructs the reader not to exclude certain cate-
gories from the reader's existing understanding of the term
enterprise.22 5 Since, § 1961(4) does not provide a definition of what
States, 464 U.S. 16, 21 (1983).
219 Cunningham et al., supra note 17, at 1564-65 (quoting Chisom v. Roemer, 111 S. Ct.
2354, 2369 (1991) (Scalia, J., dissenting)). As Justice Scalia wrote in his dissent in Chisom,
I thought we had adopted a regular method for interpreting the meaning of language
in a statute: first, find the ordinary meaning of the language in its textual context; and
second, using established canons of construction, ask whether there is any clear indi-
cation that some permissible meaning other than the ordinary one applies. If not-
and especially if a good reason for the ordinary meaning appears plain-we apply that
ordinary meaning.
Chisom, 111 S. Ct. at 2369 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Although Justice Scalia made this statement in a dissenting opinion, it has persuasive
value for Chief Justice Rehnquist's majority opinion in NOW v. Scheidler, because the
ChiefJustice himself, as well as Justice Kennedy, joined injustice Scalia's dissenting opin-
ion in Chisom.
220 Now v. Scheidier, 114 S. Ct. .798, 803-04 (1994).
221 18 U.S.C. § 1961.
222 NOW, 114 S. Ct. at 804.
223 Section 1961(4) "describes 'enterprise' not as meaning certain enumerated items, but
rather as including them. To include something is not to mean it. Indeed, to describe the
term as including other things is not an attempt to define the term at all; rather, it is an
attempt to provide examples." Blickensderfer, supra note 181, at 873-74.
224 Cunningham et al., supra note 17, at 1590.
225 Id. at 1590. Section 1961(4) uses the verb "includes" in describing the term "enter-
prise" and not "means" as is used in describing other terms in § 1961, such as "State" and
"racketeering investigation."
If Congress intended for includes to be interpreted as means, then anything that fits
within one of the categories listed after includes would count as an enterprise....
[However,] § 1961 does define other terms using 'means.' ... [Thus,] [i]nasmuch as
§ 1961 does use different verbs in defining other words, it is reasonable to assume that
includes has a different import than means in that section, just as it does in ordinary
language.
The use of the verb "includes"
seems to assume that the reader already has an understanding of what an enterprise is,
and to instruct the reader that nothing should preclude considering the listed types of
entities as possible enterprises pursuant to that understanding. In particular,
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that understanding of the term "enterprise" is, the Court must look
elsewhere for the ordinary meaning of "enterprise."226
One possible source the Court could have looked to is the dic-
tionary definition.227 The definition of enterprise, however, varies
from dictionary to dictionary.228 In addition, dictionaries do not nec-
essarily represent the ordinary usage of the word.229 Because of the
weaknesses in relying on the dictionary as a source of ordinary mean-
ing, a better source for the Court would have been a study done by a
group of linguists to determine the ordinary meaning of enterprise as
it is relevant in NOW v. Scheider.230 Specifically, the linguists tested
whether the Anderson definition of "enterprise" that requires an eco-
nomic motive reflected ordinary usage of the word "enterprise."231
The linguists' study concluded that the primary criterion the majority
of people look at to determine if an entity is an enterprise is whether
the entity has a clear goal, which can be economic or not.232 For a
smaller group of the speech community, the primary criterion for an
enterprise is whether the entity resembles a profit-seeking business, or
in other words, whether it has an economic motive.233 Thus, the ma-
jority of people subscribe to a "goal-oriented" definition of enterprise,
while the minority of people believe in a "profit-seeking" definition of
enterprise. 234  Consequently, both the Anderson definition and
Turkette definition 235 appear to reflect ordinary usage.236
§ 1961(4) seems intended as a corrective against the possibility that the reader's pre-
existing understanding of enterprise might cause her to limit the word to legally con-
stituted entities like corporations and partnerships.
Id. (citations omitted).
226 Cunningham et al., supra note 17, at 1590.
227 Id. at 1590-91. ChiefJustice Rehnquist did this in the majority opinion when he used
the definition of "affect" from WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 35
(1969). NOW v. Scheidler, 114 S. Ct. 798, 804 (1994).
228 See, e.g., Cunningham et al., supra note 17, at 1618-19 (Appendix A provides various
definitions of enterprise).
229 Id. at 1591, 1614-15.
230 Id. at 1595. The study was conducted after the Supreme Court granted certiorari to
hear NOWv. Scheidler, in an effort to show that linguists can assist judges in determining
the ordinary meaning of a statutory term. See id. at 1612-13. The study included collecting
examples from NEXIS of the use of the term enterprise in spoken and written natural
language. Id. at 1595. The study also included giving questionnaires to students and
judges that asked the subjects to decide whether they consider certain groups to be enter-
prises. Id. at 1595.
231 Id. at 1595.
232 Id. at 1610-11. These people would consider PLAN an enterprise. Id. at 1611.
233 Id. at 1611. This group would probably not consider PlAN an enterprise. Id. at
1611.
234 Id. at 1608-10. For both groups, a business is a stereotypical enterprise, but it is only
a subgroup of enterprise and is not synonymous with enterprise. Id. at 1595, 1611.
235 The Turkette Court defined enterprise as "an entity, for present purposes a group of
persons associated together for a common purpose of engaging in a course of conduct."
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Faced with two ordinary meanings of the term "enterprise," the
Court would have encountered a dilemma. However, there are four
persuasive reasons why Chief Justice Rehnquist should have expressly
adopted the "goal-oriented" definition of enterprise as the plain
meaning of the term "enterprise" used in RICO.
First, adoption of the "goal-oriented" definition satisfies the
Supreme Court's "same meaning" rule in Sedima that "[a court]
should not lightly infer that Congress intended [a] term to have
wholly different meanings in neighboring subsections." 237 Recogniz-
ing Chief Justice Rehnquist's decision that the enterprise in subsec-
tion (a) and (b) "is likely" to need an economic motive, while the
enterprise in subsection (c) "need not have . . .an economic mo-
tive,"238 the "goal-oriented" meaning of enterprise corresponds with
the use of the term "enterprise" in §§ 1962(a), (b), and (c). The
"goal-oriented" meaning encompasses both the profit-seeking use of
the term "enterprise" in subsections (a) and (b), as well as the
broader, non economically motivated use of the term in subsection
(c) 239 The "profit-seeking" definition, however, excludes the broader
meaning of enterprise in subsection (c); it does not encompass non-
economically motivated enterprises. 240 Thus, the "profit-seeking" def-
inition does not apply across all three subsections in accordance with
the "same meaning" rule; for the definition to apply universally to sub-
section (a), (b), and (c), the enterprise discussed in subsection (c)
2 4 1
must be judicially restricted to economically motivated entities2 42 con-
trary to the established policy of the Court to interpret RICO
broadly.2 3 On the other hand, it is possible to apply the goal-ori-
Id. at 1594 (quoting United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 583 (1981)).
236 Id. at 1612. The Anderson definition reflects the "profit-seeking" meaning of enter-
prise, and the Turkette definition reflects the "having a goal" meaning of enterprise. Id. at
1611.
237 Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., Inc., 473 U.S. 479, 489 (1985). Instead of using this
rule as support for the "goal-oriented" definition of enterprise, however, the majority held
that the "same meaning" rule did not apply to the situation at all since the term enterprise
clearly has different functions in each subsection. NOW v. Scheidler, 114 S. Ct. 798, 804-
05; see supra text accompanying notes 160 to 168. This was unnecessary.
238 NOW, 114 S. Ct. at 804; see supra text accompanying note 168.
239 Cunningham et al., supra note 17, at 1610-12.
240 Id. at 1611-12.
241 Section 1962 (c) discusses an "enterprise engaged in, or the activities of which affect,
interstate or foreign commerce...." 18 U.S.C. § 1962.
242 This is the case because the Court determined that the language of § 1962(c) does
not limit itself to economically motivated entities; the Court held that non-economically
motivated entities' activities may affect interstate or foreign commerce. NOW, 114 S. Ct. at
804.
243 See, e.g., HJ. Inc. V. Northwestern Bell Tel. Co., 492 U.S. 229 (1989); Sedima,




ented meaning to all three subsections satisfying the "same meaning"
rule while permitting the Court to act in congruence with its histori-
cally liberal interpretation of RICO.
Second, the Court should have adopted the "goal-oriented" defi-
nition as the ordinary meaning of enterprise because Congress used
the verb "includes" in § 1961(4), which indicates Congress' intention
"to expand the meaning of enterprise in RICO beyond businesses."244
Third, the description of enterprise in § 1961(4) includes labor un-
ions, a group that the linguists' study concluded that people do not
include in the "profit-seeking" meaning of enterprise.24 5 Finally, as
the study indicated, the "goal-oriented" definition of enterprise is the
meaning that the majority of the speech community gave the term.246
Consequently, while the Chief Justice arrived at the right conclu-
sion, that the plain meaning of RICO does not require an economic
motive for the enterprise or the predicate acts, he drew this conclu-
sion by mislabeling the statute as unambiguous and employing too
sparse of a rationale. The majority opinion would have had more
strength had ChiefJustice Rehnquist explored the ordinary meanings
of "enterprise" and specifically adopted the "goal-oriented" definition
as the plain meaning of RICO.
247
B. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY AND CONGRESSIONAL INTENT
After concluding that the language of RICO did not require an
economic motive, the Court examined the legislative history of RICO
for an express contrary intent on the part of Congress. 248 The Court
accurately concluded that the legislative history reveals no clearly ex-
pressed Congressional intent to require an economic motive for the
predicate acts or the enterprise.249 Absent such a showing, the Court
rightfully considered only the plain meaning of the statute.250
There are four reasons why the legislative history is definitely void
of any congressional intent to require an economic motive. First, as
244 Cunningham et al., supra note 17, at 1612. "In particular, § 1961(4) seems intended
as a corrective against the possibility that the reader's preexisting understanding of enter-
prise might cause her to limit the word to legally constituted entities like corporations and
partnerships." Id. at 1590 (citations omitted).
245 NOW v. Scheidler, 114 S. Ct. 798, 804 (1994).
246 Cunningham et al., supra note 17, at 1611.
247 "To the extent that a court's opinion explicitly selected one of these two criteria [the
"goal-oriented" or the "profit-seeking" criterion], subsequent applications of that opinion
to new cases might be more coherent and predictable because the actual rationale would
be seen clearly." Cunningham et al., supra note 17, at 1613.
248 NOW, 114 S. Ct. at 805-06.
249 Id.
250 See supra note 219.
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the majority noted, if Congress had desired an economic motive re-
striction on the term "enterprise," it could easily have included one.251
Instead, it appears that Congress specifically chose not to limit enter-
prise in such a way. The final version of the statute uses the term
"enterprise." In the Senate proceedings prior to the enactment of
RICO, however, the Senators used the term "business enterprise," 2
or simply "business."253 Nowhere in the final text is there any use of
the term "business."
254
Second, Congress' purpose for enacting RICO-to eradicate or-
ganized crime 255-does not exclude application of RICO to non-mafi-
oso type enterprises like PLAN. The legislative history shows that
Congress intentionally used broad language in RICO, choosing not to
limit the language to organized crime.256 As ChiefJustice Rehnquist
noted, "[t]he occasion for Congress' action was the perceived need to
combat organized crime. But Congress for cogent reasons chose to
enact a more general statute, one which, although it had organized
crime as its focus, was not limited in application to organized
crime."2 7 One reason Congress chose to adopt broad language was
to avoid "perceived constitutional problems of making 'status' a crime
and of defining just what constituted an 'organized criminal syndi-
cate.'" 258 The drafters recognized that this broad definition went be-
yond "Congressional intent or mafioso," 259 but chose to adopt it
251 NOW, 114 S. Ct. at 805.
252 See, e.g., 116 CONG. REc. 36,416 (1970). RICO would "prohibit any person from ac-
quiring or maintaining any interest or control of a business enterprise by racketeering activity,
and prohibit any person employed by or associated with a business enterprise from con-
ducting its affairs by racketeering methods." Id. (emphasis added).
253 See, e.g., 116 CONG. REC. 36,294 (1970). RICO "makes it unlawful to use income
obtained from certain designated racketeering enterprises to acquire an interest in a busi-
ness engaged in interstate commerce, to use racketeering activities as a means of acquiring
such a business, or to operate such a business by racketeering methods." Id. (emphasis
added).
254 See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961 and 1962.
255 OCCA, 84 Stat. 922 states:
It is the purpose of... [RICO] to seek the eradication of organized crime in the
United States by strengthening the legal tools in the evidence-gathering process, by
establishing new penal prohibitions, and by providing enhanced sanctions and new
remedies to deal with the unlawful activities of those engaged in organized crime.
OCCA, 84 Stat. 922.
256 Camp, supra note 182, at 65.
257 NOW v. Scheidler, 114 S. Ct 798, 805 (1994) (quoting HJ. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell
Tel. Co., 492 U.S. 229 (1989)).
258 Camp, supra note 182, at 65.
259 Id. at 65. "It is impossible to draw an effective statute which reaches most of the
commercial activities of organized crime, yet does not include offenses commonly commit-
ted by persons outside organized crime as well." Id. (quoting 116 CONG. REc. 18,940




Third, the statement of findings prefacing RICO does not man-
date an economic motive requirement.261 Non-economically moti-
vated entities could also cause the negative effects Congress attributes
to organized crime262 and which Congress intended to remedy. For
example, as the majority pointed out, "predicate acts, such as the al-
leged extortion, may not benefit the protesters financially but still may
drain money from the economy by harming businesses such as the
clinics which are petitioners in this case."263 In the same respect, non-
economically motivated entities, such as those motivated by political
or religious beliefs, may "infiltrate and corrupt legitimate business and
labor unions and . . . subvert and corrupt our democratic
processes."264 Furthermore, entities motivated by religious and polit-
ical beliefs may "weaken the stability of the Nation's economic system,
harm innocent investors and competing organizations, interfere with
free competition, seriously burden interstate and foreign commerce,
threaten the domestic security, and undermine the general welfare of
the Nation and its citizens." 265 The majority was correct that the
"statement of congressional findings is a rather thin reed upon which
to base a requirement of economic motive neither expressed nor, we
think, fairly implied in the operative sections of the Act."
266
Finally, requiring an economic motive would not bring RICO in
line with the intent of Congress to eradicate organized crime.
267
Since organized crime enterprises are not the only enterprises with
economic motives, an economic motive requirement would not ex-
clude RICO from non-mafioso type businesses. Consequently, an eco-
nomic motive requirement does not accurately implement or clearly
represent the goal of RICO.
260 Id. at 65.
261 See supra note 56.
262 In the statement of findings, Congress first complains that organized crime "annually
drains billions of dollars from America's economy by unlawful conduct and the illegal use
of force, fraud, and corruption." OCCA, 84 Stat. 922. Second, Congress complains that
organized crime "infiltrate[s] and corrupt[s] legitimate business and labor unions and...
subvert[s] and corrupt[s] our democratic processes." Id. Finally, Congress complains that
organized crime activities "weaken the stability of the Nation's economic system, harm in-
nocent investors and competing organizations, interfere with free competition, seriously
burden interstate and foreign commerce, threaten the domestic security, and undermine
the general welfare of the Nation and its citizens." Id.
263 NOW v. Scheidler, 114 S. Ct. 798, 805 (1994).
264 OCCA, 84 Stat. 922.
265 Id.
266 NOW, 114 S. Ct. at 805.
267 The argument has been made that "[Mimiting the application of RICO to those who
act with financial or commercial motives corresponds precisely to the intent of Congress."
Blickensderfer, supra note 181, at 883.
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For these reasons, the legislative history fails to show that Con-
gress clearly intended to require plaintiffs to allege an economic mo-
tive in asserting, a RICO claim. Under these circumstances, it was
correct for the majority to rely solely on the plain meaning of the
statute and conclude that RICO does not require an economic mo-
tive. It is a long stated policy of the Court that "in determining the
scope of a statute, we look first to its language. If the statutory lan-
guage is unambiguous, in the absence of 'a clearly expressed legisla-
tive intent to the contrary, that language must ordinarily be regarded
as conclusive.'"
268
C. THE FIRST AMENDMENT
Procedurally, the majority was correct not to consider the pro-
tester's and amici's First Amendment arguments that "application of
RICO to antiabortion protesters could chill legitimate expression pro-
tected by the First Amendment."269 The First Amendment, however,
is peripherally implicated by the majority's decision; RICO may reach
enterprises that typically engage in activities protected by the First
Amendment, but whose conduct has crossed the line into unpro-
tected activities prohibited under RICO. In addressing this First
Amendment issue in his concurring opinion, Justice Souter correctly
concluded that reading an economic motive requirement into RICO
is unnecessary because First Amendment concerns can be "raised and
addressed in individual RICO cases as they arise."27 0 Yet, Justice Sou-
ter's warning that it is still "prudent to notice that RICO actions could
deter protected advocacy"271 should not go unheeded.
Justice Souter's conclusion that courts may address First Amend-
ment concerns on a case by case basis is sound.272 As Justice Souter
persuasively argues, to require an economic motive instead would be
268 Reves v. Ernst & Young, 113 S. Ct. 1163, 1169 (1993) (citing United States v.
Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 580 (1981) as quoting Consumer Product Safety Comm'n v. GTE
Sylvania, Inc., 447 U.S. 102, 108 (1980)).
269 NOW, 114 S. Ct. at 806 n.6. The arguments went to the merits of the alleged predi-
cate acts, not the interpretation of the statute, and thus are matters left to the district court
on remand. Id. Respondents argued that the alleged acts are protected First Amendment
speech and do not amount to predicate offenses as petitioners claimed. See e.g., Respon-
dent's Brief at 18, NOW (No. 92-780). Respondent Murphy argued that because RICO
suits brought against non-economic enterprises will involve protected and possible unpro-
tected acts, a heightened specificity in pleading is required to determine which, if any of
the acts, meet the definition of a RICO predicate act and are thus not protected by the
First Amendment. Id.
270 NOW, 114 S. Ct. at 807 (SouterJ., concurring).
271 AL (Souter, J., concurring).
272 Id. at 806-07 (Souter, J., concurring).
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overprotective of First Amendment interests. 273 An enterprise that
does not have an economic motive may still engage in acts that
amount to violent RICO predicate offenses, which the First Amend-
ment does not protect. There is a potential problem, however, with
deciding First Amendment matters individually. Specifically, courts
will have to distinguish protected activities from unprotected activities
when applying RICO to politically and religiously motivated enter-
prises like PLAN.274
Along these lines, one commentator complains that the majority
decision will chill legitimate protected First Amendment activity be-
cause "[i] deological protesters, left uncertain as to the boundary be-
tween protected and unprotected conduct, will refrain from engaging
in protected expression in order to avoid the uncertain line of demar-
cation." 275 A simple way to clarify the "line of demarcation" is for
courts to consider an activity unprotected if it amounts to racketeer-
ing activity under RICO. Section 1961 (1) defines precisely what con-
duct constitutes racketeering activity.2 76 This standard would not chill
protected speech, and it would help control ideological groups that
have crossed the line to violence, murder, and terrorism. Unfortu-
nately, it is unlikely that the Court will establish this standard. As Jus-
tice Souter pointed out, "conduct alleged to amount to Hobbs Act
extortion .... or one of the other, more elastic RICO predicate acts
may turn out to be fully protected First Amendment aCtiVity." 277 If
this is the case, then plaintiffs and defendants will have to rely on pre-
cedent to determine where courts draw the line between protected
and unprotected activity. Until the courts establish what is protected
activity and what is not, there will be some uncertainty for ideological
protesters; however, there is uncertainty whenever the courts are in
the process of interpreting the Constitution.
A better method of establishing what is protected activity and
what is not would be for Congress to expressly and clearly make the
determination. This would provide defendants with the notice neces-
sary to organize their actions to avoid RICO suits or prosecutions.
D. FUTURE APPLICATIONS
Without an economic motive restriction, RICO will cover enter-
273 Id. (Souter, J., concurring).
274 "While the State legitimately may impose damages for the consequences of violent
conduct, it may not award compensation for the consequences of nonviolent, protected
activity." NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 918 (1982).
275 Blickensderfer, supra note 181, at 889.
276 See supra note 7.
277 NOW v. Scheidler, 114 S. CL 798, 807 (1994) (Souter, J., concurring).
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prises that commit RICO predicate offenses that go beyond First
Amendment protected acts and reach the level of organized violence.
Possibly, RICO may affect the organization of skinheads, the White
Aryan Resistance (WAR), whose gatherings have resulted in racially-
motivated beatings and murders.2 78 Seemingly less violent groups,
such as environmental activist organizations like Greenpeace, Sea
Shepherd Conservation Society, and Earth First!, may also fall within
the ambit of RICO;2 79 these groups have been known to engage in
violent acts termed ecoterrorism or ecotage.28 0
Once the courts or Congress establish a clear demarcation be-
tween protected and unprotected activity, then the broad application
of RICO will benefit society. It will help control and hopefully alien-
ate organizations of moral protesters that terrorize innocent people,
while protecting those who peacefully protest within the ambit of the
First Amendment. The Court's decision not to place an economic re-
striction on the RICO enterprise is in line with the purpose of RICO
"to seek the eradication of organized crime in the United States."28l
A liberal interpretation of enterprise allows RICO to apply to new
forms of organized crime, such as organized violence by ideological
and moral activists-organized crime of a type the drafters of RICO
probably had not envisioned, but which are covered by the broad lan-
guage Congress decided to adopt
VI. CONCLUSION
Based on the plain meaning of RICO, the Court in NOW held
that RICO does not require the enterprise or the racketeering activity
to be economically motivated.282 The Court found that legislative his-
tory and other sources of Congressional intent failed to show Con-
gress had a strong desire to the contrary.283
This Note argued that while the Court arrived at the correct in-
terpretation of RICO, the Court should have looked for the ordinary
meaning of the term "enterprise" to determine the plain meaning of
the statute. Then, presented with two ordinary meanings, the Court
should have adopted the "goal-oriented" definition that does not re-
278 See Donna E. Correll, Note, No Peace for the Greens: The Ctiminal Prosecution of Environ-
mental Adivists and the Threat of Organizational Liability, 24 RurGEmS L.J. 773, 800-01 (1993).
279 Id. at 804.
280 See, e.g., id. at 773-90. For example, Sea Shepherd has regularly blown up illegal
whaling ships in international waters. Id. at 781-84. "In November 1986, the Sea Shepherd
Society... caused serious international anxiety by destroying a government-sanctioned
whaling facility and sinking two whaling ships in Iceland." Id. at 783.
281 OCCA, 84 Stat. 922.
282 NOW v. Scheidler, 114 S. Ct. 798, 806 (1994).
283 Id. at 805-06.
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quire an economic motive. In addition, this Note argued that the
Court was correct in finding that the legislative history shows no clear
Congressional intent to require an economic motive. Thus, the
Court's rejection of an economic motive requirement was the appro-
priate result; if the Court had held otherwise, it would have violated
the separation of powers doctrine by judicially legislating restrictions
into the broad language of RICO. Finally, this Note asserted that the
majority's decision to allow non-economically motivated predicate acts
and enterprises within the ambit of RICO does not infringe upon the
First Amendment.
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